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Abstract 
Musical Digital Service Providers (DSPs), like Pandora and Spotify, rely on a patchwork of databases and 
services to acquire licenses for the music they play. This results in both inefficiency and an unfair 
advantage to parties that have the leverage to negotiate better terms than their independent counterparts. 
A universal music database would be a giant step toward rectifying this inequality, as well as lowering the 
barrier to entry for new DSPs. Here, the main obstacles for such a system are laid out, as well as a 
possible scheme for such a universal database that includes the most recent technological developments 
in this field. 
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1 Introduction 
 There are two copyrights in every musical work, the musical composition and the sound 
recording. Each copyright is comprised of a “bundle” of exclusive rights that the holder is legally allowed 
to exercise. As the copyright system has developed in the U.S. in response to technological changes over 
the last one hundred years, the ways that the two copyrights are exploited falls under various sets of rules 
and regimes. In the digital marketplace, the governance of sound recording copyright enforcement is 
especially tricky. Artists and record labels struggle to find equitable ways to license their work, and Digital 
Service Providers interface with a complicated royalty system with the federal government mediating 
some components of the transactions. Here, the problems related to the system’s complexity and 
asymmetry will be discussed, followed by a possible solution to the current problems. 
2 The Current Music Licensing Scheme 
The current state of licensing for online services is complex and dynamic (Menell, 2014). The number of 
parties involved and the systems they use create a dizzying locus that includes Performing Rights 
Organizations (PROs), publishers, Digital Service Providers (DSPs), record labels, and others (see Figure 
1). Although a genetic relationship exists between pre-digital distribution systems like physical media and 
radio, and new forms of music consumption like streaming internet radio and interactive services like 
Spotify and Deezer, these new modes of musical experience represent issues that disconnect previous 
payment schemes from a relevant modern paradigm (Handke et al., 2015). The inefficiencies in the 
system also lead to either significant loss of information or inaccurate payouts to the appropriate parties. 
Three main issues that will be discussed here are the problems with private, unregulated deals; variances 
in reporting standards; and some of the regulatory regime inefficiencies. 
 
RightRightholder Composer/Lyricist Performer Producer 
Reproduction on 
emission server 
C/PC? C/PC? PC? 
Authorization of 
communication in 
territory of emission 
C C/R C/R 
Communication to the 
public in territory of 
reception 
C C/R C/R 
Reproduction in territory 
of reception 
C/PC? C/PC? PC? 
Table 1. Rights Matrix to License a Point-to-Point Internet Communication of a Sound Recording 
Containing a Performance of a Protected Musical Work (C, Right likely administered by a collective; PC, 
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use possibly covered by private copying regime; R, right is only to remuneration (as opposed to 
exclusive).)(Gervais p. 12) 
 
2.1 Private Deals 
 The three major record labels that control a majority of the copyrighted sound recordings that are 
licensed by DSPs (Waldfogel, 2013) often enter into direct deals with DSPs in order to arrive at more 
lucrative agreements than would be offered through a statutory license. These deals include equity in the 
service companies and tiered payment structures that create an unfair advantage for smaller labels that 
cannot leverage their catalog into such arrangements. According to various analyses (Garcia 2013) the 
presence of private deals both complicate the payment process for artists and new businesses trying to 
create innovative services (Sinnreich, 2013). One contract that was leaked between Sony Music and 
Spotify indicated that not only are the deals straightforward, but have an impact on other companies that 
deal with Spotify because of Most Favored Nations clauses. 
2.2 Variance in Reporting Standards 
A recent report on the state of the music industry states that 
 
rights owners often persist in defining their own standards for data reporting from digital services, 
meaning there is still no common output standard and dozens of different services end up 
reporting in multiple formats, resulting in gross inefficiencies. (Rethink Music, 2015) 
 
Because no universal data format or platform exists for various parties to report through, information ends 
up being fragmented and inaccurate. Because there is no system in place for “tying usage to ownership,” 
artists are generally disenchanted with whatever possibilities for revenue the Internet may have offered 
(Swanson 2013). In Europe, where some attempts at creating a single marketplace have also resulted in 
a more accessible data system, some initial reports of efficiency and artist satisfaction follow after 
implementation (Mazziotti, 2011). 
2.3 Regime Inefficiencies 
In the systems that do exist for royalty payment in the digital marketplace, obfuscation is the result of 
incompatible information systems, as well as intermediaries between the DSP and the artist. To 
complicate the problem further, research shows that record labels receive seven times more from DSPs 
than their artists, extending the disenchantment that they feel about digital distribution (Lilly, 2015). The 
absence of regulation guiding how PROs and labels interact with DSPs and with their artists expose the 
need for regimes to be held to a standard that allows for marketplace competition and simultaneously 
prevents the sorts of abuse we currently see. Without a transparent information flow, it is nearly 
impossible to clearly identify where regime changes need to be made. 
 Furthermore, much of the revenue owed to rightsholders often does not make its way beyond 
market intermediaries. A report claims that “the major recipients can pocket unclaimed royalties and have 
no incentive to locate the owners of musical works” (Rethink Music, 2015, p. 27), which further 
exacerbates the current problems in the digital marketplace. 
Another problem lies in the structural imbalances of the private direct deals that dominate the 
economics of digital music. In 2014, Darius Van Arman, an independent record label executive and 
advocate told the judges on the Copyright Royalty Board  
 
I estimate that digital audio streaming revenues (noninteractive and interactive, combined) will 
exceed digital sales revenues for our labels within the next five years. If there is not a strong 
royalty rate for statutory webcasting … I am afraid that we will not be able to break even on most 
of our releases. (Copyright Royalty Board, 2014) 
 
So, in addition to inefficient regimes, the lack of parity between how PROs and DSPs deal with major and 
independent record labels compounds the problem of unclear revenue streams. 
3 Possible Solutions 
To further identify the problem in digital music licensing, Daniel Gervais (2012) writes that “there are ways 
in which the situation could be simplified, notably by agreements among CMOs (collective management 
organizations) that allow one participating CMO to grant a worldwide license on behalf of all other 
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participating entities” (p. 12) Such a worldwide license would need a database of all musical works, and 
would need to be freely accessible to DSPs and rightsholders. 
A report put out by the Rethink Music project (Rethink Music, 2015), a collaboration between The 
Berklee Institute for Creative Entrepreneurship and the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at 
Harvard University, discusses blockchain technology as a method for establishing a single database of 
sound recordings. Most associated with cryptocurrencies like bitcoin, blockchain is an attractive solution 
because it provides for a decentralized, instant method of payment. The database would include 
information about who should be paid (a task that is currently overly complicated and inaccurate) and 
would distribute funds to the appropriate parties. Some companies are already testing the possibilities of 
this technology and see it as a promising solution for a universal database (Holmes, 2015). 
Such a database would require a considerable amount of cooperation between rightsholders, PROs, 
and other industry entities like record labels. Furthermore, Rethink Music suggests the formation of a 
nonprofit charged with acting as a hub for such a database, much in the same way that the Internet’s 
DNS system is run by a nonprofit organizing body. 
4 Conclusion 
 The changes that the Internet has brought to information processing does not currently include 
payments for the digital music marketplace, especially of the revenue generated from the sound recording 
copyright, even though it should. The current system of royalty payment is patchy, inefficient, and creates 
a high level of disenchantment amongst musical artists. A viable single database solution must be able to 
take into account the complex web of actors who play a part in this marketplace, and must also consider 
the multinational nature of associated transactions (an artist is much more likely to have listeners across 
the globe than they would have prior to digital distribution). Blockchain technology provides an intriguing 
and attractive framework for such a database, and more work must go into parsing the details of its 
operation, including who would organize it, the exact details of protocol, and how all parties can 
cooperate in order to achieve a higher efficiency. 
5 References 
Copyright Royalty Board. (2014). Committee on the judiciary subcommittee on courts, intellectual property 
and the Internet Testimony of Darius Van Arman. Retrieved from 
http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/0f007c39-4b39-4604-8c62-79e58af436a8/final-
a2imdariusvanarman0621.pdf. 
García, K. A. (2013). Private Copyright Reform. Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev., 20, 1. 
Gervais, D. J. (2010). Collective management of copyright and related rights. Kluwer Law International. 
Handke, C., Balazs, B., & Vallbé, J. J. (2015). Going means trouble and staying makes it double: The 
value of licensing recorded music online. Journal of Cultural Economics, 1-33. 
Holmes, B. (2015, November 24). Transparency issues in the music industry could be solved by 
blockchain technology. Retrieved October 10, 2014, from 
http://bravenewcoin.com/news/transparency-issues-in-the-music-industry-to-be-solved-by-
blockchain-technology/ 
Lilly, P. (2015, February 6). Record labels reap 45 percent of royalties from streaming services, study 
finds; artists lucky to pocket 7 percent. Retrieved from 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2881115/record-labels-reap-45-percent-of-royalties-from-
streaming-services-study-finds-artists-lucky-to-poc.html. 
Mazziotti, G. (2011). New licensing models for online music services in the European Union: From 
collective to customized management. 
Menell, P. S. (2014). Copyright office music licensing study: Comments of professor Peter S. Menell. 
Menell (May 23, 2014). UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper, (2441561). 
Rethink Music. (2015). Fair Music - Transparency and Payment Flows in the Music Industry. Available at 
https://www.berklee.edu/sites/default/files/Fair%20Music%20-
%20Transparency%20and%20Payment%20Flows%20in%20the%20Music%20Industry.pdf 
Sinnreich, A. (2013). The piracy crusade: How the music industry's war on sharing destroys markets and 
erodes civil liberties. 
Swanson, K. (2013). A case study on spotify: Exploring perceptions of the music streaming service. 
MEIEA Journal, 13(1), 207. 
Waldfogel, J. (2013). Digitization, copyright, and the flow of new music products. Handbook of the 
Economics of Art and Culture, 2, 277. 
